Aristotle, aseity

A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion
by Anthony C. Thiselton, M.Th., Ph.D., D.D.

(Page 5 of 9)

Aristotle (384-322 BCE)

Aristotle is widely regarded as among the half-dozen most influential philosophers of Western thought, and as one of the two most important philosophers of the ancient world. He made lasting contributions to LOGIC, to METAPHYSICS and to ETHICS. His metaphysics, or ONTOLOGY, includes what may be called a NATURAL THEOLOGY of God and of the 'ordered' structure of the world. His metaphysics aimed to construct a unified 'science of Being qua Being'.

Born in Stagira in Macedonia, Aristotle came to Athens at the age of eighteen, to study at PLATO'S Academy for the next twenty years. After Plato's death he travelled to Asia Minor, and returned to Macedon where Philip appointed him tutor to his son Alexander (Alexander the Great). In 335 bce he returned to Athens to found his own philosophical school. This he held in the Lyceum or Peripatos, which also came to serve as names for the Aristotelian school. He taught for twelve years until 323 bce, a year before his death.

In contrast to Plato's theory of Forms (or Ideas), Aristotle began from observations about particular objects or cases, and reasoned a POSTERIORI towards a unified understanding of the world and of reality. In one of the senses of the term 'inductive reasoning', Aristotle followed an inductive method, although he also formulated a rigorous formal DEDUCTIVE logic. His twofold emphasis on the diversity of the world and a unified theory anticipated an approach that would lead in due course to medieval SCHOLASTICISM.

METAPHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY: CAUSE,
SUBSTANCE, THE WORLD AND 'GOD'

'Reality', for Aristotle consisted not in Plato's universal, abstract, Forms or Ideas, but in a hierarchy of Being which began with particular objects in the world. Stones, trees, animals and people constitute the building-blocks that instantiate types or species, or 'forms' in Aristotle's own non-Platonic sense of the term.

Aristotle's notion of causality offers a helpful introduction to his metaphysics or ontology. A cause (Greek, aitía) may be of four kinds. In the construction of a statue, for example, the material cause (Greek, hyle, matter or material) may be marble or brass. The efficient cause (Greek, archè tês kineseõs, commencement of the motion) is the blows of a chisel. The formal cause (Greek, ousía, being or substance) is the pattern or distinctive idea in the mind of the sculptor, or a given architectural style. The final cause (Greek, telos, end) is the purpose for which the statue is made; the end that it will serve).

This paves the way for understanding both the complexity and plausibility of Aristotle's concept of reality. Substance constitutes a basic, underlying category, to which attributes may be predicated. These modes of existence may be characterized in terms of quantities, qualities, relations, location in space, location in time, and action or being acted upon by another object.

Aristotle inherited from Empedocles the ancient notion that the basic 'elements' which combined to form the material world were earth, water, air and fire, characterized also as hot or cold, wet or dry. This is closer to modern thought than the Greek terms in English translation might suggest. For they represent respectively solid, liquid and gas; and a luminous, incandescent, hot, gas capable of serving as a catalyst or to produce change. Thus the application of fire differentiates the solid, liquid and gaseous state of ice, water and steam.

This state of affairs underlines the point that matter is mutable and exists as 'POSSIBILITY'. Possibility, however, points not to a chain of infinite causal regress, but in due course to an Unmoved Prime Mover (Greek, proton kinoun akineton). This logic is fundamental to most versions of the COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT for the existence of God and especially to the first three of the FIVE WAYS of Aquinas.

Aristotle's concept of an 'ordered' world suggested to him that the ontological 'primary existent' is neither merely 'universal' nor a material particular. This cannot be 'matter' (Greek, hyle) as such, because matter is merely potential. The primary existent is the 'form', but not in Plato's sense of an Idea outside the world. Within Aristotle's emphasis on a unifying system of particulars within the world, his 'form' amounts to the full sum of the characteristics of the species to which the particular thing belongs. An apple tree, for example, is defined not in terms of a specific, solitary tree; but as an organism that together with others of its type or species has its own distinctive 'unity of end' as a full life-process in relation to other life-processes.

Behind this, Aristotle infers a Prime Mover who is Unmoved (Greek, prôton kinoûn akíneton). This Unmoved Mover is 'Mind' (noûs) or 'God'. 'God is perfect ... is One ... Therefore the firmament that God sets in motion is one.' Aristotle's universe therefore has a divine 'orderedness' and coherence that also embodies diversity, as AUGUSTINE, AQUINAS, and AL-FARABI sought to expound and to underline.

Aristotle sets out this ontology in part in the Categories and mainly in the Metaphysics, as a First Philosophy. In effect it is almost a natural theology. 'Reality' is a teleological hierarchy of existents, a graduated scale of forms, looking toward the more rational and more complete. This is the Prime Unmoved Mover, who is Mind. (see principle of plenitude); teleological argument for the existence of God.)

Aristotle's concept of 'God' is set out in his Physics, books VII-VIII, and in Metaphysics, book XII. As actuality, not possibility, God is changeless and immaterial (On the Heavens, 279A, 18). God moves in a non-physical way (Metaphysics, 1072B, 4). Aristotle anticipates later versions of the COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT for the existence of God. However, although God is final and efficient first cause, this is not a doctrine of 'creation', since Aristotle perceives the world itself as eternal.

THE LOGICAL SYLLOGISM AND PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC

Many regard Aristotle's work on formal logic as his greatest contribution to philosophy. He regarded deductive logic as fundamental, and provided what amounts to the first formulation of a logical syllogism in his Prior Analytics. Together with his work on the philosophy of language in On Interpretation and in Categories, this inspired the logical enquiries of ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, for which the syllogism retains primary importance, as well as the Augustinian-Thomist Christian tradition.

In his work on the syllogism Aristotle distinguished between the 'three terms', of which there must not be more than three, in the major and minor premises and the conclusion that must 'necessarily follow'. The 'middle term' is the term that occurs in both premises, and forms a bridge between them. It must not change its meaning through redefinition (Prior Analytics, 25B, 32-7). DEFINITION, therefore, occupies no less an important place in Aristotle's logic.

We may illustrate the logical principle with reference to one version of the cosmological argument, which is unmasked by the formal syllogism as involving a strictly invalid step. The syllogism may superficially run as follows:

Major premise:	Every state of affairs has a cause.
Minor premise:	The universe is a state of affairs.
Conclusion:	Therefore the universe has a cause.

On the surface the three terms 'state of affairs', 'world' and 'cause' appear to represent no more than three terms. However, 'cause' and 'state of affairs' in the major premise mean 'caused cause' and 'caused state of affairs'; while in the minor premise the term 'state of affairs' has changed its meaning. Further, if the conclusion alludes to God, 'cause' here denotes 'uncaused cause'. Hence as a formal logical syllogism it breaks down.

The example itself is not drawn from Aristotle, but if logical notation is used to replace the examples, it can be seen that A, B, B₂, C and C₂ amount to at least A, B, C, D. Symbolic or, notational logic thus exposes the fallacy. Aristotle used symbols to represent logical variables, and this transposed arbitrary language into a formal logical 'science'.

Definitions are clarified by Aristotle through genus et differentia. For example, 'a human being is a rational animal' defines 'human being' through the genus of the animal kingdom and the differentia of human rationality. Aristotle elaborated further forms of predication: in addition to genus and difference, also species, property and ACCIDENT (CONTINGENT rather than necessary predications).

Propositions remain the basic units of Aristotle's formal logic (propositional logic). The standard form, as today, may be represented by the symbols S (subject) and P (predicate). Their relation may be one of affirmation or denial (Prior Analytics, 24A, 16). In turn, the affirmation or denial may be universal ('All S ...' or 'No S ...'); or particular ('Some S ...' or 'Some S is not ...'). These four logical forms are (Greek) schemata (forms or figures). It would take us beyond the scope of this entry to include Aristotle's explorations of 'necessary' and 'possible' influences (see MODAL LOGIC).

TRUTH, 'SCIENCE' AND ETHICS: AN 'ORDERED' WORLD

Aristotle's special attention to propositions and his theory of definitions cohere with his view of truth. This is firmly a correspondence view of truth. A noun (Greek, onoma, name) and verb (rhema) combine as REFERENTIAL and attributive components to form a proposition, statement or assertion, which either corresponds or fails to correspond with the state of affairs to which it refers, and which it represents.

This exposition in On Interpretation specifies the truth-conditions of various types of proposition. However, in Posterior Analytics there is a hint of a broader notion of truth and knowledge. 'Scientific knowledge' does not merely concern assertions that certain states of affairs are the case, but more especially explores 'the causes of things' and their explanations. Yet deductions and formal syllogistic logic remain in play, since the principles of 'science' must be necessary, invariant and demonstrable.

Aristotle does not remain in the realm of theory, however. His Nicomachean Ethics and Politics address issues of decision, ethics and action. The 'good' is 'well-being' (Greek, eudaimonia), which transcends mere pleasure, honour, or wealth, but is the fulfilment of that end (telos) for which humankind and the world exist. To discuss this requires the use of reason and the exercise of patience. All structures, including the structures of the world and of human life, are organized for the end for which they exist.

In more concrete terms, choices toward the good, when habituated, become virtues. The four cardinal virtues represent a relative mean between two less constructive extremes: courage (between rashness and cowardice); moderation (between profligacy and apathy); generosity (between extravagance and miserliness); and greatness of soul (between boastfulness and meanness of soul). Hence Aristotle addresses issues of human choice, the will, and character, as well as questions of ontology and logic.

Yet all are woven into a unifying system within which each branch of philosophy plays its part. Aristotle's 'ordered' philosophy reflects his 'ordered' view of the world as a hierarchy of particularities derived from a First Unmoved Mover. Augustine, Islamic philosophy, and Thomas AQUINAS draw on this legacy.

aseity

The term denotes an order of being that is 'from itself (Latin, a se esse). It most usually denotes the uniqueness of God, Allah, or a 'Prime Mover', as ens a se in contrast to all contingent, or finite, beings or objects. These, but not God, are dependent on an agency or cause outside themselves. The ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT for the existence of God presupposes that God is a NECESSARY Being in this sense. The COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT for God's existence also postulates this different order of Being as a fundamental alternative to the need to assume an infinite or endless chain of caused causes, all of which depend in turn on some external agency or source of causation.

ANSELM'S designation of God as a se is to be logically distinguished from SPINOZA'S notion of a 'self-caused' Being. This concept would fail to meet the criteria for a genuinely necessary Being, as in Anselm and in the third of the FIVE WAYS of Thomas AQUINAS. In the modern era TILLICH maximizes this distinction when he insists that God is 'Being-itself in contrast to the more reductive assertion that 'God exists'. The latter may risk compromising divine aseity.

© 2002 Oneworld Publications All rights reserved.

About the Author

Anthony Thiselton is Emeritus Professor of Christian Theology at the University of Nottingham, and Canon Theologian of Leicester Cathedral and Southwell Minster, UK. His academic career has involved fellowships in both the UK and the US, he has lectured around the world, and has published seven books and over 50 papers.