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analogy

The wider context of the use of analogy in LANGUAGE IN RELIGION is set out in detail under that separate, broader entry. The use of analogy is one of the most important primary linguistic resources for talk of God. It permits an extension of meaning or logical grammar beyond that of everyday uses of language, while retaining everyday language as its vehicle or vocabulary-stock.

Analogy, however, is not the only resource of this kind. The roles of SYMBOL, METAPHOR, MYTH, CONCEPTUAL GRAMMAR, AND MODELS AND QUALIFIERS are also considered under LANGUAGE IN RELIGION, as well as under separate entries.

The classical formulation of the use of analogy in talk of God comes from Thomas AQUINAS (1225-74). In thirteenth-century debate analogy was seen as a middle way between equivocal (or ambivalent) language, which applied everyday language to God without genuine currency, and univocal language (i.e. language that conveys the same literal meaning in a one-to-one match). Further, it also offered a middle path between the language of negation (VIA NEGATIVA), as advocated by the German mystic Meister ECKHART (1260-1327), and language that conveyed a positive, determinate, cognitive content.

THE BASIC APPROACH OF THOMAS AQUINAS

AQUINAS firmly excludes any suggestion that everyday words can be applied to God with exactly the same meaning as they carry in contexts of everyday life. He writes: 'It seems that no word can be used literally of God' (Summa Theologiae, Ia, Qu. 13, art. 3 (Blackfriars edn, vol. 3, 57)). However, he does not agree with PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS that on this basis 'it would be truer to say that God is not good or wise ... than to say that he is' (ibid.). For analogical uses of language one should steer between over-confident univocal uses and over-reticent insistence on the via negativa only.

Moreover, to use analogical language of God is not to equivocate. Language would be equivocal (Latin, aequivoca) only if there were no resemblance (Latin, similitudo) between how the word is used in everyday language and how it is applied to God (ibid., art. 5 (Blackfriars edn, vol. 3, 63)). 'Wisdom', for example, can be applied to God without undue ambiguity or impropriety, because there is at least some degree of resemblance, however inadequate, between what it is to ascribe wisdom to God and what it is to ascribe wisdom to a human person. AQUINAS agrees that this is not 'univocal' in meaning (ibid.).

AQUINAS sums up his general view in this way: 'Some words are used neither univocally nor purely equivocally of God and creatures, but analogically, for we cannot speak of God at all except in the language we use of creatures ...' (ibid. (Blackfriars edn, 65)).

CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE BASIS AND
NATURE OF ANALOGY IN AQUINAS

Even during the thirteenth century Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) argued that AQUINAS tried to hold together two incompatible views. For when confronted with any claim for a univocal use of language in talk of God, AQUINAS emphasized the value of the via negativa in excluding even the barest hint of a one-to-one match between language about created beings and language about God. He did not reject the use of negation: God is infinite; God is immortal. However, he insisted that the way of negation could not offer a comprehensive or exhaustive linguistic resource, but played its part only in complementing analogy.

This marks AQUINAS off from the mystical tradition of Meister Eckhart, from the approach of the Jewish philosopher MAIMONIDES (1135-1204), from Plotinus (c. 205-70) and NEOPLATONISM, Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 500) and strands within Eastern Christian theology.

On the other side, however, Duns Scotus questioned the reliability and stable basis of analogical language, believing that it risked making clear and determinate concepts of God and divine action too vague and indeterminate to convey a reliable content. Such concepts as truth, unity and goodness may be applied, he argued, univocally. Otherwise, in what lies knowledge of God?

All the same, AQUINAS believed that analogy, rightly applied, could serve to convey cognitive truth about God. He appealed to an analogy of 'attribution' and an analogy of 'proportionality'. A quality or characteristic can be attributed to someone in a derivative sense. A further more radical qualification emerges from proportionality: whatever is analogically common to two or more beings is possessed by each not in the same way but in proportion to its being.

Thus 'God is wise' is not merely an analogy with 'Socrates is wise' or 'Paul the Apostle is wise'; it also entails the proposition that 'wise', as applied to each, carries a meaning that accords with the distinctive being of each.

This, in turn, implies that an analogy of language rests on an analogy of being (analogia entis), and it is this aspect that Barth (1886-1968) attacks as presupposing a Thomistic 'NATURAL THEOLOGY'. Recently, however, Alan J. Torrance has questioned how far this emphasis rests on an interpretation of AQUINAS that became dominant through the writings of Thomas Cajetan (1468-1534), Italian cardinal and philosopher (Torrance, Persons in Communion, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996, 127-48).

Interpretations of AQUINAS on analogy are controversial and too technical for further discussion here. Fundamentally AQUINAS appealed to various logical devices to avoid on one side the collapse of analogy into ANTHROPOMORPHISM and on the other a logical grammar that retained no real currency. The problem, however, that he did not fully solve was that of establishing criteria for appropriate uses of analogy.

AQUINAS attempted to refine some of the issues by identifying an 'analogy of proportionality' in which an analogy is held formally, but in proportion to the nature of the analogue. Thus human fatherhood has analogies with divine fatherhood, but is also limited in scope because of the finitude and fallenness of human nature. Hence the 'attribution' of analogy is bound up with its proportionality.

KARL BARTH'S CRITIQUE

It is, in effect, the basis of Thomas AQUINAS's appeal to the currency of analogy that Karl Barth attacks, rather than the use of analogy as a purely linguistic or semantic tool within the framework of Christian theology. Barth rejects the notion of 'a common denominator' to which God and the created order may 'both be reduced', like species that belong to a common genus (Barth, Church Dogmatics III: 3, Eng., Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 19, 102).

Thus, while he questions the whole notion of an analogia entis as a metaphorical or ontological notion supposedly independent of theology or revelation, Barth is nevertheless willing to allow for a analogia operationis, i.e. for its actual operative currency within theology. The basis lies in God's sovereign act of self-disclosure, which is appropriated as an 'analogy of faith'.

Barth's arguments take us beyond the realm of philosophy. Nevertheless, within philosophy of religion there is room to explore the entailments of a theology of God that perceives God as sheer self-gift.

The medieval and traditional notion of analogia eminentiae, of working from the lower to the higher, may address issues of intelligibility, provided that it is not transformed into an ontology that transposes the TRANSCENDENCE of God into what AQUINAS seeks to avoid, namely a projected anthropomorphic construct.

Philosophical controversy about similarity and difference and theological beliefs about 'the image of God' and the incarnation of the Word in the person of Jesus Christ as person cannot be held apart. Further, the issue of criteria for the valid use of analogy cannot be separated from the wider issues examined under the entry on language in religion, where these detailed questions emerge in their proper context.

analytic statements

Analytic statements are true a priori, i.e. by virtue of the definition of their concepts or terms, rather than on the basis of states of affairs in the world. The statement 'all bachelors are unmarried' or 'all circles are round' depends on what constitutes the concept of a bachelor or of a circle. It does not depend upon observations about particular bachelors or circles in the world.

KANT used the term 'analytic proposition' for those statements in which the predicate is covertly contained in the subject, e.g. 'six is a number'. While the early work of WITTGENSTEIN treated such statements as purely formal, i.e. in effect as logical tautologies, in his later work WITTGENSTEIN observed that even a formal tautology might perform some additional function in everyday life, e.g. in directing attention to what might otherwise be neglected or unnoticed.

In his work on LOGICAL POSITIVISM, AYER exempted analytical statements from the need for empirical verification, i.e. they could convey logical meaning even if their truth could not be verified by observing states of affairs in the world. (See also EMPIRICISM; ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT for the existence of God.)

analytical philosophy

The term serves as a broad and vague title to denote the methods and explorations of those philosophers mainly in the Anglo-American traditions of the twentieth century who seek to clarify the logical forms and sometimes the grammar of concepts used in philosophy. It characteristically denotes a rigorous examination and clarification of logical forms which might have become obscured by sentences of natural languages.

It is easier to name the specific philosophers with whom the analytical movement is most closely associated than to suggest a list of features. These include: Russell (1872-1970), George E. Moore (1873-1958), Ayer (1910-89), and the earlier work of WITTGENSTEIN (1889-1951). However, more broadly the term is sometimes extended to include the 'informal' logical explorations of Ryle (1900-76) and Austin (1911-60), among others, although Austin represents what is more often called 'Ordinary Language' philosophy.

Since 'analysis' is derived from the Greek analuo, to loose, or to untie, it is tempting to cite Wittgenstein's aphorism that we should 'look closely at particular cases' and avoid any 'craving for generality' (The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969, 16 and 17). However, in his later work WITTGENSTEIN expressed reservations about the logical atomism that served to break down complex propositions into their most logically primitive building-blocks of meaning (Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Black-well, 1967, sects. 39-63).

LOGICAL ATOMISM, LANGUAGE GAMES,
'COMMON SENSE' AND LOGIC

Although Russell favoured a more radically analytical method, Wittgenstein was concerned more especially with avoiding those generalizing propositions that removed words and concepts from the settings in everyday life that gave particular cases their logical and linguistic currency. The problem about such grandiose questions as 'What is time?'; 'What is language?' or 'What is a proposition?' is that 'the language-game in which they are to be applied is missing' (ibid., sects. 92 and 96). We must avoid 'superconcepts', such as 'language' or 'world', unless we pay attention to their specificities of contexts-in-life (ibid., 97).

Early in the twentieth century G. E. Moore posed such a question in response to the grandiose metaphysical claims of Bradley. If 'time is unreal', why do we take breakfast 'before' lunch? If reality is 'spiritual', are chairs and tables more like us than we may think? Moore wrote 'A Defence of Common Sense' which contained propositions that seemed to conflict with many of the more grandiose claims of philosophers.

Russell shared with Wittgenstein a 'distrust' of the surface grammar of language. His work on logic provided formal logical devices for reformulating statements which in ordinary language appeared to make a truth-claim about an entity while the formal logic of the utterance or sentence could be shown not to do so.

Thus in his Principia Mathematica (3 vols. 1910-13, with A. N. Whitehead) Russell developed a theory of descriptions that allowed for the logical reformulation of such sentences as those containing the phrases 'the King of France' or 'a round square' to 'analyze out' what were strictly not 'referring' expressions at all. In technical terms an 'existential quantifier' could be used in logical notation to separate out whether or not truth-claims about one entity entailed truth-claims about another. (The notation would take some such form as (Ex) (Fx ...).)

Russell pressed his drive toward analyses to postulate a theory of 'logical atomism' (lectures in 1918, based on earlier work). However, his understanding of the smallest possible components out of which propositions were built differed from that of the early Wittgenstein. Russell linked his theory with a quasimaterialist view of the 'elements' of the world; in Wittgenstein's view these 'atoms' were purely logical postulates.

'INFORMAL' LOGIC, CONCEPTUAL ELUCIDATION,
AND CATEGORY MISTAKES

AYER'S exposition of LOGICAL POSITIVISM and the principle of verification is discussed separately. A more constructive version of 'linguistic' philosophy emerged with the work of Ryle. In The Concept of Mind (London: Penguin, 1949) he undertook a logical exploration of the relation between language respectively about the mind and the body in the Dualist tradition of DESCARTES, which he called 'the myth of the ghost in the machine' (ibid., 17).

Ryle perceived the Cartesian doctrine as portraying life lived 'through two collateral histories' (ibid., 13). However, logical analysis exposes 'a category-mistake' (ibid., 17), for the logical currency of what is stated about each differs. This 'double-life' theory generates logical puzzles that are illusory. If body and mind 'exist', each 'exists' in a quite different logical sense (ibid., 24). A fresh logical analysis of the vocabulary relating to intellectual action is needed, including exploring dispositions (see belief).

In Dilemmas (Cambridge: CUP, 1954) Ryle applies these methods of logical analysis to a series of traditional logical puzzles. Thus the phrase 'It was to be' need not express fatalism, as soon as we understand the difference between prospective and retrospective logic, or 'anterior truths and posterior truths' (ibid., 26; 15-35). The paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, first formulated by Zeno, depends for its force on the difference between the logic employed by an observer and the logic employed by a participant in the race. Only if we confuse logic that applies to 'the total course' with the participant perspective of the runner does the possibility of a 'paradox' emerge (ibid., 36-55). Again, however, this approach is more strictly 'linguistic' philosophy than 'analytical' philosophy.

In his final essay, 'Formal and Informal Logic', Ryle contrasts 'the logic of insulated and single concepts', which often take the centre of the stage in formal logic, with 'the logical dynamics of apparently interfering systems of concepts' (ibid., 125).

In the 1950s a spate of collections of essays (mainly articles from journals) appeared under such titles as Essays in Conceptual Analysis (1956) edited by Antony Plew, with contributions from Strawson, G. J. Warnock, John Hospers, J. O. Urmson, Stephen Toulmin and others. However, enough has been said to indicate the varied methods and ethos that the umbrella title 'analytical philosophy' serves to denote.

animism

Animism denotes the belief that many instances of natural phenomena (plants, trees, stones) possess 'souls' (Latin, anima) or life-spirits. These may then be perceived as quasipersonal and capable of address. In animistic religion these may become objects of reverence or worship.

Two aspects are especially significant for philosophy of religion. First, animism may be said to extend unduly and uncritically the use of ANALOGY and ANTHROPOMORPHISM.

Second, in Primitive Culture (1871) Edward B. Tylor argued that all religion originated as primitive animism. However, today it is widely recognized that Tylor's work rests on flawed assumptions. In the first place, primitive religion did not function like a primitive pseudoscience to explain the world. Its function is different, and does not compete with 'science'. In the second place, Tylor was too heavily influenced by the almost obsessively evolutionary climate of the late nineteenth century. Robert Segal presses both criticisms ('Tylor's Anthropomorphic Theory of Religion', Religion, 25, 1995, 25-30). (See also EVOLUTION.)

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Tags: Religion and Spirituality

About the Author

Anthony Thiselton is Emeritus Professor of Christian Theology at the University of Nottingham, and Canon Theologian of Leicester Cathedral and Southwell Minster, UK. His academic career has involved fellowships in both the UK and the US, he has lectured around the world, and has published seven books and over 50 papers.