New Communication Approaches

Negotiate This! By Caring, But Not T-H-A-T Much
by Herb Cohen

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Quite to the contrary, if you want to impact favorably on the other side's decision making, you've got to be other-directed, understanding their values, beliefs, experience, and mind-set. Businesspeople call this being "customer- or client-focused." The same is true in Arthur Miller's play The Price, where the octogenarian appraiser Gregory Solomon explains, "If you don't understand the viewpoint, you don't understand the price."

Beyond a doubt all human beings perceive, discover, and create their realities according to the maps or paradigms they have in their minds. Hence it is natural to ascribe our beliefs, values, concerns, and aspirations to those with whom we negotiate. But we must guard against this inclination. Such "mirror imaging" or projection on our part will only produce discomfort and discord. Recognizing this problem, common sense might tell us that when engaged in any attempt to influence behavior we must start out asking more questions than giving answers and listening more than talking. Needless to say, too many people cannot resist the urge to immediately inaugurate the discourse with a generic sales pitch that extols the technical features of their services, products, ideas, or proposals. Instead, viewing yourself as a problem solver, you should try to elicit from the other party their underlying concerns, interests, preferences, and needs.

Given this approach the basic formula works like this: First off, you should begin by asking questions even if you think you know the answers. Not only listen to what they are saying, but convey that you are engaged in active listening. How do you do this? Well, when they speak, look at them, and smile and nod when it's appropriate. Do not mask your reactions with a poker face, even if you've heard it all before. Try to display empathy and understanding, since people want to know that you truly care about their situation.

Second, write down what they are saying. Often people ask, "But what if their comments are gibberish, asinine, and moronic?" To which I say, "In that case it's even more important for you to record their claptrap; you may be the only person who has ever taken them seriously." Remember, people want to be in a relationship with those who respect their point of view.

Third, while taking notes, pause occasionally to read back to them what you have written. In all the years I have been doing this, never once has the other side said, "Gee you got that perfectly." Usually their reaction is, "You left something out" or, "I believe you mischaracterized that." At this point, I willingly change what I have, conforming to their wishes so that we may establish a consensus of their concerns.

Fourth, I allow them to tell their story in their own way, which means that they sometimes digress and meander. Never do I interrupt to keep them on track, because I know that ultimately their willingness to say "yes" will not be based only on facts, hard evidence, and rational thinking. Certainly, decision making will also be affected by gut instincts, comfort level, emotions, feelings, predilections, learning ability, risk tolerance, pride, past experiences, and perceived consequences. Make no mistake: Persuasion is more complicated than it may look at first blush.

Fifth, although opinionated and judgmental to some extent, I try to control my words and reactions. Consequently, even if I disagree strongly with what's been said, I qualify my objections by saying, "I think I understand your position, but from my narrow perspective, limited as it may be, I see it this way..."

Finally, I never spend any time arguing or debating with people. I don't show them where they are wrong, foolish, stupid, or misinformed. Even if I might overcome their arguments and prevail, such a victory would prove self-defeating inasmuch as my potential partner may be thinking, "Do I want to enter this relationship where I regularly meet with him in the future for further humiliation?" It would take a strange person to willingly acquiesce to such an arrangement.

Reduced to essentials, you want to always see yourself as a problem solver, someone with very sensitive antennae who is probing deeper and listening louder to acquire information. This will help you overcome the potential barriers to gaining agreement and making a deal. Here's a rule of thumb: See every negotiation, whether it's with your child or a business transaction, as a cross-cultural encounter where you start out sensitive to a differing perspective. Consequently, gather intelligence with the attitude of knowing that you don't know because individuals not only reveal but also conceal information.

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Applying Conscious Inattention

Let's now consider two world headline dramas where using negotiating savvy I attempted to influence the course of events. In retrospect these efforts did not produce national acclaim nor was my reputation especially enhanced. But you can judge for yourself.

The Seizure of the Japanese Embassy
in Lima, Peru, in December 1996

On the week before Christmas in December 1996 over five hundred members of Peru's elite had gathered at the Japanese embassy to celebrate the birthday of Emperor Akihito. Among the guests were Supreme Court justices, ministers, generals of the National Police, diplomats, and business executives. While they were sipping cocktails and swallowing sushi an explosion shattered the surrounding wall and fourteen masked men and women (some of them teenagers) started firing their weapons and announcing, "We are the Tupac Amaru and you are our hostages." The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement was a group that espoused political violence and had as its mission the establishment of a Marxist regime. It had gotten its name from the last emperor of the Incas, who was executed by the Spanish in 1572.

That's what I knew about this situation until I received a phone call to come to the White House a few days after the occurrence. Since I was one of those involved in the FBI's Hostage Negotiating Program in Quantico, Virginia, and was constantly warning our government about the scourge of international terrorism, I was looking forward to a long meeting with the President where I would share my thoughts and philosophy.

Upon arriving I met with a national security expert who gave me a concise review of the situation and asked whether I would be willing to go to Peru to afford President Alberto Fujimori the benefit of my experience. Answering affirmatively, I was putting away my pad when the door to the briefing room opened partially.

Looking up I noticed the head of President William Jefferson Clinton popping in. It was just his head, not his body. To this date, I have never seen his body in person—only his head. So don't ask me anything about his body 'cause I'm not acquainted with it. However, I do know the head and it spoke to me. "Good luck, Herb," it said, and, "Remember, this matter involves plausible deniability." Which after translation into English means, "When you screw this up, we don't know who you are." So it was with this vote of confidence that I was on my way to Lima, Peru.

When the plane landed, I didn't even go through customs but into a large limousine that took me to the Presidential Palace, where I was greeted by President Fujimori. He shook my hand, offered me a cup of tepid tea and a plate on which rested one cracker. At the time I remember looking for something to put on the cracker; which tells you a lot about my personal needs and priorities. While I gazed about, the President excused himself saying, "I'm not involved in the details of this, but the military is." As if on cue the door swung open and three army generals strode in, marching in lock step. They were wearing uniforms and caps with fruit salad on the beaks. Down their uniforms they had an abundance of service ribbons, and medals were around their necks. Noticing their appearance I remember thinking, "Did I miss a big war down here? Because I've got to be in the presence of some of the world's bravest people."

At the outset, following the dictates of my charge from the White House, I began to detail my credentials as I shared my experiences with the generals. Looking back now, I must have been talking one helluva lot, because I soon realized that they were staring at the ceiling. The only time I paused was when the general with the most decorations held up his hand and said, "You want to know about hostage negotiations? I'll tell you what I've been through. I came from a small town, Alca. Once a nine-year-old boy took a dog that didn't belong to him and ran into a wooden shack. And do you know what we did? We surrounded the shack and counted to ten for him to come out." Although thinking to myself that this culture is slower because in America we do "one-two-three," I leaned forward and asked, "What happened next?" Shrugging, he replied, "We burned down the shack." Somewhat bewildered, I inquired, "What happened to the boy?" He answered indifferently, "The dog jumped out and ran free."

Was he just putting me on or was this a metaphorical story to communicate how they deal with hostage takers? At the time I remember thinking that just spending time with these guys would cause the loss of brain tissue and a precipitous drop of my IQ.

In hindsight I realize that my problem was that I had forgotten the advice that I gave you previously about questioning rather than telling. I had put myself in the role of "gringo expert" talking down to the common people. Conspicuously absent up to that point in my demeanor was any sense of humility and humanity.

Recognizing that I was losing credibility, I changed course and began to focus on them: their families, their travels, their tastes, and their lives. In short, to stop the skid I let go of the wheel.

Surprisingly after a time, our relationship changed and the generals gradually revealed what was going on. From them I learned that President Fujimori was infuriated by the takeover. Not only was this a humiliation for him and his government, but also his mother, sister, and brother were among the hostages. As a result, they had already started digging a rescue tunnel and preparing 150 commandos for an imminent attack. In addition, the President, who was dedicated to eradicating terrorism, wanted this to end forcibly by Christmas, as he would not negotiate with "this band of outlaws" under any circumstances.

Eventually I was able to get the generals to understand and to agree that time was in our favor if we wanted to safeguard the lives of the civilians. Respecting Fujimori's wishes that there be no formal negotiations, a Commission of Guarantors (consisting of the head of the Red Cross, the Canadian ambassador, and a respected Peruvian archbishop) was formed to engage in "preliminary conversations" with the hostage takers. It was through these contacts and the relationships that developed between the captors and their captives that a great number of hostages gained their freedom, culminating with the release of 225 as a "goodwill gesture" just before Christmas.

When I left Lima fewer than one hundred hostages were still being held and the crisis had calmed considerably. Both sides had reduced their demands and they had settled into a contest of wills, playing to audiences at home and abroad. Significantly, the Peruvian government was using the tunnel excavations as a means of gathering intelligence and were willing to be patient "even if it took three months." Perhaps more telling was that Nestor Cerpa Cartolini, commander of the operation, was starting to worry about his image and did not want to be compared to the more violent Shining Path terrorist group.

The denouement, which is still somewhat controversial, came after a 126-day siege. While the rebels were playing indoor soccer without their shirts and weapons, they were surprised by a massive commando onslaught. Making use of the intelligence that was collected over time, the security forces were able to safeguard the lives of almost all of the remaining hostages. The one exception was a businessman who sustained a heart attack during the assault and died on the way to the hospital. In essence, it was the passage of time, which allowed them to gather information, that saved the day for the remaining captives.

Although many who were directly affected by these events have melancholy memories, on occasion when I think back to my visit to the Presidential Palace I remember Edward R. Murrow's dictum: "The obscure we see eventually, the completely apparent may take longer." But godfather Michael Corleone may have been more to the point when he said, "The one thing I learned from Pop was to try to think as people around you think."

The Iranian Hostage Crisis—November 1979

Doubtlessly many of the West's difficulties with the Muslim world had at their genesis, or were at least exacerbated by, the Ayatollah Khomeini, the godfather of hate directed at America. Indeed, the handwritten words left behind by Mohammed Atta, the leader of the kamikaze nineteen that gave us the atrocity of September 11, 2001, are almost identical with the instructions Khomeini furnished to the thousands of children who were given the "keys to paradise" before exploding themselves on landmines during the Iran-Iraq War.

You may recall that this problem was first brought forcibly to our attention when a multitude of Iranian students seized the American embassy in Teheran in November 1979 and took fifty-two diplomats hostage. Despite the provocation of this Persian version of Dog Day Afternoon, President Jimmy Carter responded with admirable initial restraint and patience. But then, from my scape we seemed to engage in mirror imaging—applying our standards and values to the muddle and mobocracy that was developing in Iran. We publicly observed that the holding of our citizens was a violation of international law and a breach of diplomatic tradition. Also, President Carter informed us that he was praying for the hostages morning and night. And, oh yes, embarking upon the "Rose Garden Strategy," he would not actively campaign against Senator Ted Kennedy in the Democratic presidential primary. As might be expected, despite all the media fanfare and public outrage, the hostages remained.

The upshot was that I ultimately met with President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in mid-December 1979 to discuss observations on how to influence the behavior of the Iranian mullahs.

Presumably what brought this about was my experience, which seemed especially apropos for the crisis. Formerly, I mentioned that I worked with the FBI and was knowledgeable about hostage negotiations. But there was more: To begin with I had spent considerable time in Iran involved in commercial dealings. Second, I was a student of Islam and Shi'ism. Third, I knew a great deal about Persian history and culture. Last of all, when I was with the United States army in West Germany, I had met Ayatollah Behesti, then an adviser to Iranian students, but now the leader of the Islamic Republican Party in Iran. Based upon this background, I saw my task as explaining to the Carter administration how the mullahs viewed this situation. Our purpose I thought should be to get into their world and furnish them with incentives, both positive and negative, to gain the freedom of our citizens.

When the meeting began I started to explain how our adversaries come from a bargaining culture, which is different from ours. At the outset, I remember saying something along these lines: "How do Americans feel about negotiating? We don't even like the word, calling it haggling or chiseling. My own wife has even said to me on many occasions, 'I do not lie for money.' Of course, the implication is that I do. But in Iran everything is bargained for.

"Think of your own experience. Have you ever purchased a Persian rug retail? Even if you wanted to, they wouldn't let you. It would be a cultural sin.

"From their bargaining mind-set the mullahs see this as a buy-sell transaction." I continued, "They have fifty-three hot rugs for sale (one was later released) and are trying to obtain as much as they can for their illegally obtained merchandise. So when President Carter walks into the rug sellers' bazaar and tells the prospective seller how much he wants and needs the merchandise, the price is not going down. In fact, this may even raise the ante.

"What's happening is that by the behavior of the administration and our massive media coverage we are creating more demand for the rugs. Since the supply is limited, the cost is going up. So, quite unintentionally we are prolonging the captivity of the hostages."

At this point the President cut in: "Herb, I don't think you understand. You, myself, and the mullahs, we're all from the same Abrahamic tradition." When I first heard that I didn't even know what he was talking about. But then I sort of figured it out and it struck me that the President and I may have been from that religious tradition, but not the mullahs.

Resisting the inclination to get sidetracked, I continued. "Okay, let's look at Americans. What is the largest single purchase we make in our lives?" Without waiting for the answer I blurted out, "Yes, it's a residential home. Now even if that prospective house is in a tract area, a development where all the homes look alike, how do we know what to pay?"

Again acting as if this was a rhetorical question I moved on. "Indubitably we look for the big sign in the sky. You know the one that's 150 feet up there that says in big block numbers $179,226. Yup, that's what we're paying, the same as everyone else, what it says on that sign. So what if we're getting ripped off at that price? We don't care, 'cause everyone's getting screwed at that price. Hey that's the American way, equality of screwing across the board."

Undeterred by the apparent lack of enthusiasm for my presentation, I never paused. "And surely when we make this purchase we are going to do it quick. You know, fast. Because in our culture, time is money, so it's in and out.

"Meanwhile how about the Iranian mullahs? Well, first of all they will bargain everything. From their experience, you can negotiate anything. Furthermore, if you're a mullah, by dint of your occupation you're unemployed. Other than your obligatory prayers five times a day, the remainder of your activities are spent looking to kill time. So, we are coming from a different place."

President Carter interjected, "I don't think you understand the Ayatollah, Herb," he went on. "By all reports he's not like you and me. He's a martyr. He wants to die. Chhooomayne doesn't care about his own life." The President always strung out the name, prolonging the CH sound as if clearing his throat. It was like he knew Farsi and I didn't.

Shaking my head, I remarked, "A martyr, not exactly. How old is Khomeini?" The President, who had an exceptional grasp of details, responded, "Eighty-six years and eight months."

"Okay," I said, "that proves it. How can you have an eighty-six-year-old martyr? On the face of it the life expectancy of a martyr is probably 19.2 years. Certainly when you get into your twenties or thirties you need another career."

The inevitable result was that when I returned home from meetings like this in Washington, I was generally pessimistic, maybe even depressed. Walking into my household I would be greeted by my wife, Ellen, who is an upbeat, optimistic person. She'd say with a big smile, "Hey, how'd it go?" At the time I remember saying, "Do we have any United States Savings Bonds? Well ... sell!"

And there you have it: Fortunately President Jimmy Carter brought the fifty-two Americans safely back from captivity. Unfortunately it took 444 days to achieve the result.

After the White House meeting, I continued to work with the administration attempting to obtain the release of our diplomats. In the subsequent months I wrote a number of memorandums and frequently met with members of the State Department and National Security Council, but all to no avail. Of these meetings, it cannot even be said that we were ships that passed in the night. I don't even think we were sailing in the same waters. For whatever reason I could not get the decision makers to understand the mentality and mind-set of the Iranian mullahs.

Of course, what these criminals were doing was in violation of international law, but considering their objectives, frame of reference, and mental set, their behavior made sense to them and should have been predictable to us. Almost without exception you don't change people's behavior through rhetoric but only by altering their ways of looking at things. This means that if we wanted to facilitate the release, we should have had a coherent action strategy that made the Ayatollah realize that it was not in his interest to allow the status quo to continue. In other words, in the cost-benefit calculus of our adversary, the disadvantages of retaining the hostages would far outweigh the benefits of keeping them.

But instead of getting into the head of the ruling mullahs and being other worldly, we were invariably looking for a quick fix. This being the Middle East, the magic potion was usually someone who we thought knew someone who knew someone. That in turn led to Teheran visits by Ramsey Clark, Yasser Arafat, Kurt Waldheim, and even cleric Valerian Cappuci. As you doubtlessly know, they all failed.

After about three months of frustrating trips to our nation's capital, I returned to earning a living. Thereafter, much to my amazement, I was contacted by Republican party stalwarts who were concerned that a Jimmy Carter "October Surprise" would alter the presidential election's outcome in the final weeks. Ultimately, I met with Governor Reagan's campaign manager, William Casey, and finally the candidate himself at a home he was renting in Virginia. Before even doing this I had one major concern and condition, and that was that the plight of the hostages not be introduced into the political campaign. Once this was agreed upon, I gave Governor Reagan my viewpoint on the situation, much of which was memorialized in a confidential memorandum sent to him on October 25, 1980. (The appendix of this book contains this document along with the Jack Anderson syndicated column of February 12, 1981, which refers to it. Presumably, after the presidential inauguration in January 1981, this writing was given to the media. It's worth reading, because using the approach discussed I actually predicted the date that the fifty-two hostages would gain their freedom.)

In the intervening years, I have been asked numerous times, "How were you able to analyze this matter and foretell the outcome with such certainty?" My best answer is that, unlike others whose intellect and intelligence were superior, I didn't have a career or reputation invested in this crisis. And I was less inhibited by a desire for acceptance or fear of disapproval. Not knowing any of those held captive, my vision wasn't obscured by emotion. Most significant perhaps was that as an outsider I was able to see what more accustomed eyes overlooked—to observe in an unhabitual way.

This applies to you as a negotiator. While in the midst of fervent discussion and emotive people, you must try to remain aloof from the turmoil, so as to be able to see the unfolding pattern. Imagine if you would, that at the same time you are participating, you are also above the fray, listening with a third ear and observing with a third eye, much like an out-of-body experience.

What you are striving for is the perspective of an outsider. This will enable you to care, but not t-h-a-t much. What seems certain to me is that satisfaction in life is often best achieved by finding the proper balance between effort and relaxation. In the final analysis it's not what happens but your view of what happens that counts. For what you and I see is often determined by what we already believe and think we know. Surely we don't see with our eyes but with our brain. And to further complicate what we call "objective reality" may be our relative position in space and time. Conceivably, that's why in Antarctica the temperature at which water freezes is called the "melting point."

Picture it this way: Effective negotiating requires balance. That means everything in moderation...including moderation. You want to care but not t-h-a-t much, just as you want to trust, but not t-h-a-t much.

It is in this sense that Islam's Hadith, which are the sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, declares, "Trust in Allah, but always tie up your camel."

Prominent Points

• Whenever you engage in any purposive social exchange or negotiation, detach yourself emotionally to gain perspective, so you can see the pattern, relationships, and interconnection of things.

• To be effective in influencing behavior, start out by trying to acquire information about your counterpart's beliefs, motives, values, and underlying needs.

• Always view yourself as a problem solver, searching for creative alternatives that can satisfy both sides' real concerns and interests.

• Since all behavior makes sense from the standpoint of the actor, attempt to see the problem through their eyes and experiences.

• In dealing with avowed opponents, realize that getting them to change is in direct ratio to their pain threshold. Behavior won't be altered until they believe that the danger of intransigence outweighs the cost of accommodation.

• When we care too much our adrenaline starts flowing, causing us to become doped up and dumbed down.

• Even when subjected to irrational discourse, emotional diatribes, or the threat of an impasse, strive for a balanced attitude of caring, but not t-h-a-t much.

Copyright © 2003 by Herb Cohen

About the Author

Herb Cohen has been a practicing negotiator for the past four decades, intimately enmeshed in some of the world's headline dramas - from hostile takeovers to hostage negotiations. His clients have included business executives, entrepreneurs, sports and theatrical agents plus large corporations as well as governmental agencies, such as the Department of State, F.B.I., CIA., The U.S. Conference of Mayors and The U.S. Department of Justice.