Making Experience an Asset : Part 3

Increasing Efficiency In Business: A Contribution to the Psychology of Business
by Walter Dill Scott, Ph.D.

(Page 14 of 16)

Last week on the golf links I saw a Bohemian peasant woman wearing clothes full of small holes. I tried to figure out how the clothing had become so injured. I recalled seeing a coat that had been left all summer in an attic till it had been eaten to pieces by the moths. On the basis of that recalled incident I satisfied myself by means of the practical judgment that she was wearing moth-eaten clothing. A few days later I saw three of these women working on one of the greens, and each of them had on clothing full of small holes. I began to reflect as to the cause of the holes. I observed that each woman held a bottle in her hand and was apparently applying the contents of the bottle to the roots of the dandelion plants. I inferred that the liquid must be an acid. Then of all the qualities of an acid I considered merely its corrosiveness. With that abstraction in mind I made the reflective judgment that the women were working with an acid and that from time to time particles of the acid got on their clothes and corroded them.

A manager of a large manufacturing and selling organization made a study of the conditions affecting the prosperity of his organization. From his observations he deduced the principle that for him it is more important to increase the loyalty of the men to the organization than to reduce the apparent labor cost. With this principle in mind he made various reflective judgments in upbuilding his organization.

In these illustrations of theoretical or reflective judgments it will be observed that no previous single experience was in the mind of the one forming the judgment but merely a generalization, an abstraction, or principle.

The experience that is really capitalized is the formation of the generalizations, abstractions, and principles which are thereafter available for reflective judgments and can be applied to a multitude of novel situations but situations in which the generalization, abstraction, or principle is a factor.

The significance of reflective judgments in increasing human efficiency was manifested in a striking manner by the following experiment. A group of individuals were tested as to their ability to solve a number of mechanical puzzles. The time required for each individual was recorded. The subjects then described as completely as possible how they had solved the problem (worked the puzzle). In some instances the subjects kept trying blindly, till by accident they hit upon the right method. In such cases the second and third trials might take as long or even longer than the first trial. If, however, the subject had in mind the right principle or principles for solving the problems, the time required for succeeding attempts fell abruptly. Curve A of Figure 6 is a graphic representation of the results of A with one of the puzzles. To solve the problem the first time required 1476 seconds. While solving it this first time A discovered a principle upon which success depended. The second attempt consumed 241 seconds. While solving the problem this second time he discovered a second principle. With these two principles in mind succeeding attempts were rendered rapid and certain.

Another young man, B, in solving his problem. (Chinese Rings Puzzle) succeeded after working 1678 seconds. At the completion of this successful attempt he had in mind no principle for working it. The second trial was not so successful as the first and lasted 2670 seconds. With succeeding trials he reduced his time but not regularly and was still working "in the dark." His method was one of extreme simplicity and probably not different from the "try, try again" method employed by animals in learning. The results of his first ten trials are graphically shown in Curve B of Figure 6.

A comparison of Figure 6 with the five figures of Chapter X will show how rapidly increase of efficiency is when dependent upon judgments as contrasted with improvement dependent upon habit.

A judgment once having been made may be utilized again and again. The process of applying these preformed judgments is known as an intuitive or perhaps better called an expert judgment.

Expert judgments

Just as appropriate concrete experiences determine the nature and the range of practical judgments, and as the formation of generalizations, abstractions, and principles determine the possibilities of reflective judgments, so the actual formation of the practical and reflective judgments determine the nature and the range of the intuitive or expert judgments.

Some years ago I had a need for an attorney to perform for me a petty service. Just at that critical moment I met a friend who was a lawyer. I employed him forthwith. At a later time I needed a lawyer again, recalled my former experience, and called up the same attorney. This employing him the second time was clearly a practical judgment. If I have frequent need for an attorney, I shall probably make use of my preformed practical judgment and employ this same attorney. This act will never become a habit, but it will approximate more and more a habitual action, and will seem to be performed intuitively, and will be an illustration of an expert judgment.

This morning I was asked to find a cook and man of general utility for an outing camp. I had no preformed practical judgment which I could apply to the case and did not even possess a remembrance of any experience upon which I might base a practical experience. In such a case therefore I am not only not an expert but I do not possess the necessary preliminary experiences for developing such ability.

During the last decade I have given much thought to this question: Does the efficiency of one's thinking depend at all upon the clearness and distinctness of the mental image used in the thinking? I settled the question in the negative. The formation of this principle (clear thinking does not depend upon clear visual image) was an act of reflective judgment. But now the application of this preformed judgment has developed into an expert judgment. Recently I was given the manuscript of a course in psychology and asked to appraise it. One of the chief points of the author was to advise all business men to develop clear visual images. In fact he asserted that clearness of thinking was in proportion to clearness of the visual image with which the thinking is carried on. Without again weighing the evidence for my principle, I applied my preformed judgment and by means of this expert judgment condemned the course.

A man is expert only in those fields in which he has developed the appropriate habits, the necessary, practical, and reflective judgments, and has had some practice in applying these judgments.

We find that four classes of experiences are valuable, i.e. such experiences as result in the formation of habits; such as result in practical judgments, in reflective judgments, and in expert judgments. Our final task is to consider methods for increasing the probabilities that such experiences may be secured and utilized.

About the Author

Walter Dill Scott (1869-1955) was one of the first applied psychologists. He applied psychology to various business practices such as personnel selection and advertising. In 1900 he was appointed instructor of psychology and education and director of the psychological laboratory at Northwestern University. In 1905, Dr. Scott was made professor of psychology and head of the department of psychology.